The Israel Defence Forces' strategy in Gaza has undergone a significant shift since Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir assumed the role of Chief of Staff. This shift is evident in the intensified military pressure on Hamas and – even more dramatically – the significant overhaul of the humanitarian aid policy, marking a sharp contrast to the approach under his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi.
First, on the military operational side. Now the IDF holds onto every territory it captures, systematically clears above and below-ground terror infrastructure, and favours heavier, more secure operations that minimise IDF casualties – even at the expense of slower progress. Rafah has been almost completely dismantled, and in Khan Yunis, the IDF had chased Hamas terrorists out a year ago. Now, the IDF's focus is on infrastructure destruction to prevent Hamas from rebuilding.
In Jabaliya, the IDF issued evacuation orders, and the population began moving toward Gaza City even before the Air Force resumed airstrikes. According to the military, over half of Gaza is under IDF control, to reach 75% within months. However, much depends on whether a ceasefire agreement is reached and how talks to end the war develop. With pressure mounting from the White House, the IDF may not have unlimited time.
However, IDF sources say the real game-changer lies in the second shift: Israel's humanitarian aid strategy. The IDF recently launched a plan to bypass Hamas' control of humanitarian aid and the bottlenecks caused by the UN's slow distribution. Under a government-approved operation, aid is now delivered directly to civilians within humanitarian zones in the Strip.
In the past two weeks alone, more than 340 UN aid trucks have entered Gaza through alternative routes, fully coordinated with the IDF and under tight military supervision. The goal: reduce the risk of Hamas looting the aid for itself while denying the population their basic needs.
Security officials report that these alternative routes offer key advantages. First, they traverse areas under IDF control, blocking Hamas access. Second, they allow direct delivery to civilians. Third, they diversify aid corridors – bypassing chokepoints like the Salah al-Din road and weakening Hamas' logistical grip.
Field data shows early success: using the Philadelphi Route to deliver UN aid has already lowered flour prices. Just weeks ago, a bag of flour cost over 1,000 shekels in Gaza. Today, a kilo costs around 30 shekels in southern Gaza.
Despite these gains, the IDF acknowledges persistent challenges with the UN, which resists setting up formal distribution centres and struggles to distribute aid effectively. More than 450 aid trucks were recently stuck on the Palestinian side of the Kerem Shalom crossing – uncollected and undelivered.
While some looting incidents have occurred, military sources believe they are the work of local civilians, not coordinated Hamas efforts. "Aid is reaching the public directly, and dependence on Hamas is fading," an IDF spokesperson said. "The more we route aid outside of Hamas's control, the more we erode its political and economic grip on the Strip."
A senior General Staff officer concluded that cutting off Hamas from humanitarian aid could be the true game changer in the war – potentially even toppling its rule. This new policy requires some adjustments, and the IDF has had to fire some warning shots in the process. Yet Hamas, being aware of this severe risk to its terror regime, is doing its best to sabotage and undermine the humanitarian operation. It tries to do so by staging riots next to these distribution centres, as well as spreading false information about Palestinians killed in the process.
The fact remains that not only is aid reaching Gaza civilians directly, but Hamas has also lost control of the convoys, which are increasingly looted by a desperate population that fears Hamas less than before.
As a result, critics of the earlier phases of the war feel vindicated. Former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, and former Southern Command Chief Yaron Finkelman are accused of mishandling the campaign. Even as Israel faced threats from Hezbollah in the north, the IDF's sequential operations in Gaza – failing to secure and hold territory – cost precious time and, more painfully, lives. Alternative voices, like that of Brig. Gen. (res.) Moshe "Chico" Tamir, were sidelined.
Prime Minister Netanyahu also shares responsibility. He built a narrative around the claim that October 7 would have been different had he been adequately briefed. Yet he never challenged the military's approach or demanded alternatives. The necessary political initiative of replacing Hamas, which should have complemented the military strategy, never materialised.
However, this development is a double-edged sword: Hamas still holds the fate of the hostages – both living and dead. As the Defence Minister put it, Hamas has two choices: a deal or destruction. In both scenarios, the hostages' fate hangs in the balance.
According to Chief of Staff Zamir, Israel must pursue a deal to secure the release of as many hostages as possible before it's too late. In closed discussions, Zamir emphasises that Hamas is at its lowest military and civilian standing since 2007. As heinous as Hamas is, if it is no longer in a position to negotiate, the hostages' fate may be sealed. Without a functioning leadership, no one will be left to engage with on a potential deal.
All the while, fear of the organisation is eroding in Gaza, and independent clans now operate in its place. Hamas has never been weaker since its 2007 takeover of Gaza, yet this military success presents its own strategic dilemma.
Yossi Yehoshua is a military correspondent for Yediot Ahronot and I24News in Israel
