Reports are circulating that the United States may be considering an interim deal with Iran that would not remove the entire nuclear threat but only temporarily pause uranium enrichment. If confirmed, such an agreement would risk trading fleeting calm for long-term peril.
It is true that pausing enrichment, particularly if it included shipping out Iran’s stockpile of uranium, could offer tactical advantages, provided there is a firm and time-bound commitment to dismantle the entire programme. If that objective holds, then a temporary pause and removal of stockpiles could give the US, Europe and Israel valuable breathing space. Most critically, exporting the enriched uranium would blunt Iran’s ability to “sneak out” to a bomb or, in the event of a military strike, race to the finish line.
But the fear is that Iran, sensing US reluctance to use force, may once again string along another administration. This may then not be the first step towards a final agreement but the start of endless talks, giving Iran time to outrun the clock, including on bringing back UN sanctions. Reports further suggest that Tehran may get some sanction relief just as economic pressure is weakening the regime.
President Donald Trump famously called the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) “the worst deal ever negotiated”. In his first term, he withdrew the US from the nuclear accord and imposed a policy of maximum economic pressure to force the regime back to the table.
When Trump left office in 2021, so too did the doctrine of maximum pressure. But on his return this year, the policy was promptly reinstated, this time with even greater urgency. Iran’s nuclear programme has since advanced dramatically. It now possesses enough highly enriched uranium for ten nuclear weapons if further enriched, advanced centrifuges and an arsenal of long-range missiles.
Worse still, it remains governed by an Islamist regime committed to Israel’s destruction and hostile to the West. Just last month, several Iranians were arrested in the UK, allegedly plotting to bomb the Israeli embassy. Imagine Iranian terror and aggression once shielded by a nuclear umbrella.
A nuclear-armed Iran capable of intercontinental missile delivery is not just a regional threat. It would pose an uncontrollable risk to Europe and the US, and likely trigger a nuclear arms race in one of the most unstable parts of the world. Any agreement that fails to confront this full threat matrix would not be a diplomatic achievement. It would be strategic surrender.
That is why the administration’s announcement that Iran’s nuclear programme must be completely dismantled was such a moment of clarity. From the president down, the goal has been clearly stated: no enrichment, no long-range missiles, no weaponisation. The policy is sound. Now comes the test of execution.
It is understandable, and indeed desirable, for any president to prefer diplomacy over military action. As Trump bluntly put it, the programme must be dismantled “nicely or viciously”. And right now, Iran is uniquely vulnerable. Its proxies are reeling. Israel has destroyed much of Hamas, significantly weakened Hezbollah, and pushed Iranian forces out of Syria. In October, Israeli strikes hit Iran’s missile production sites and crippled its air defences. Tehran is isolated, weakened and exposed.
This is not a moment to offer the regime a lifeline. It is a moment to press the advantage, particularly as the International Atomic Energy Agency just revealed that Iran has ramped up uranium enrichment during the talks, engaged in covert nuclear activity and failed to properly cooperate with the IAEA. This is not a reformed regime. It is one still deceiving the world while edging towards the bomb. Yet precisely now, at this moment of maximum leverage and urgency, Trump may be considering a stopgap deal.
Iran, sensing opportunity, is back at the table, despite having vowed never to speak to Trump and, until recently, allegedly plotting to assassinate him. Tehran’s logic is transparent. Trump has so far failed to end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza as he had promised. A quick diplomatic win on enrichment would offer him a political boost.
An interim deal would give Iran time to recover and drive a wedge between Washington and Jerusalem. The president himself confirmed last week that he had told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to delay military action.
Timing matters. On October 18, the UN “snapback” mechanism, the last chance to reimpose all UN sanctions lifted under the JCPOA, expires. Activating it takes up to six weeks, meaning the real deadline is much sooner. While the US is no longer a party to the deal, the UK, France and Germany are – and they appear ready to act. An interim deal, however, could delay or block this step, depriving the West of its final multilateral pressure tool.
Iran knows this. That is probably also why it is suddenly eager to negotiate. It has dropped its defiance and is betting that the West remains more interested in deferral than resolution.
Trump said he would dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme completely. This moment may be his best chance to make good on that promise. But if he trades it for an interim deal with no firm path to dismantlement, history may not remember him as the president who ended the worst deal ever but as the one who revived it.
