In the regional arena, Israel has already won the war that started on October 7, 2023. While the fighting is not over yet, a confrontation with Iran is potentially dangerous and there is no sustainable “solution” available in Gaza, the balance of power in the Middle East shifted dramatically in favour of the Jewish state and its de-facto Arab allies.
The radicals have never been more humiliated, isolated, vulnerable and intimidated and the moderate, stability-seeking Arab regimes have only rarely felt more self-assured and surreptitiously grateful for the Israeli resolve in fighting their common enemies.
For decades, from the mid-1950s to the 1970s, the radicals used to dominate the “Arab World”. Gamal Abd-al Nasser created a messianic movement, encompassing politically aware Arab elites and “masses”, stretching “from the (Atlantic) Ocean to the (Persian) Gulf”, enthusiastically backing the aggressive anti-American and anti-Israel policies of Egypt’s charismatic president.
Following three major confrontations with Israel – in 1967, 1969/1970 and 1973 – President Anwar Sadat realised that Egypt could no longer sustain perpetual war. In 1979, Sadat signed a separate peace treaty with Israel, practically abandoning all the Arab radicals who were committed to the “liberation of Palestine” from the Jews. In the absence of Egyptian leadership and the failure of the Assad dynasty in Syria and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to replace it, all-Arab “liberation” wars essentially ended half a century ago. The 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and the 2020 Abraham Accords consolidated this strategic reality.
The emergence of the Iranian threat following the 1979 Islamic Revolution provided the radicals with an alternative regional power leadership for the struggle against Israel, but the strategic environment was fundamentally different from that of the 20th century. The Arab component of this radical camp included only one significant state – Syria – and even that was torn apart by a savage civil war. The rest were mere remnants of the once-mighty Arab coalition, militarily potent and dangerous, but politically and nationally marginal: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria.
Much more important than their marginality, these dedicated foes of Israel – Iran and its proxies, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Houthis – are also the most dangerous enemies, regionally and domestically, of most Arab states and their regimes.
Since October 7, Israel has devastated in Gaza the only Arab state-like entity controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. The IDF also reduced Hezbollah from an intimidating strategic threat, practically in control of Lebanon, to a major nuisance, fighting a rearguard battle for its position in Beirut and in the South. And Israel’s Air Force exposed the supreme vulnerability of Iran’s most-defended sites. Israel’s unique missile-defence system, assisted by the American Central Command, in coordination with Arab Gulf States and Jordan, demonstrated the structural limitations of Iran’s only strategic response to Israeli deep-penetration raids. All this directly led to the collapse of Assad’s regime in Damascus, immediately followed by the utter destruction of its military hardware.
In Cairo, Amman, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Rabat, Arab leaders could not afford to infuriate their populaces by openly celebrating the dramatic weakening of their regional deadly enemies and giving Israel the well-deserved credit for inflicting the required blows. However, they know that sustainable Israeli resilience, strategic power, determination and tenacity in the struggle against common radical enemies are indispensable for their own regional welfare, sometimes even their existence. Whereas America is immeasurably more powerful, Israel, in their experience, is an infinitely more trustworthy and dependable partner in this ongoing struggle. Israel is unlikely to engage in appeasement of the mullahs in Tehran, as President Barack Obama did, or try to save the savage Houthi rebels in Yemen from the Saudis and the Emiratis, hoping to pacify them with humanitarian aid, as President Joe Biden did.
Arab leaders, particularly in the Gulf, were deeply impressed by Israel’s demonstrated ability to do what they themselves craved: to consistently deepen and widen its alliance with the United States, even during unfriendly administrations, while, at the same time ignoring and even openly rejecting ill-advised directives from Washington on critical issues of national security.
Capitulating only to Biden’s obsession of delivering humongous “humanitarian” aid to Hamas in all the wrong times and locations, Israel consistently rejected his pressure of prematurely stopping the war in early 2024. Yielding to these demands would have turned the war against the regional radicals into a defeat for Israel and most Arab states. It would have restored Hamas in Gaza, prevented Hezbollah’s defat in Lebanon and precluded the exposure of Iran’s strategic vulnerability.
The war is not over. The crucial question of Iran’s nuclear quest and hegemonial ambitions is still to be determined. The objective of consolidating an American-led regional structure incorporating Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states is somewhat more difficult in the immediate future, even when it is far more desirable and possible in the mid and long range. In Gaza, there can be no constructive alternative to Hamas and protracted clashes are inevitable. In Lebanon, Hezbollah will at least partially recuperate. In Syria, a prominent and hostile Turkish position could present Israel with a serious threat.
The Middle East as a whole, however, has taken a major turn in the last year and a half – a turn for the better, for a change. The radicals are much weaker. Consequently, the mainstream stability-seeking Arab states are more confident. Israel is exhausted, but much safer, and even the Americans are somewhat more realistic. The region is still volatile and a lot depends on containing Iran, but the chances to avoid a catastrophe are better than they have been in a long time and everybody recognises Israel’s indispensable contribution.
Dr Dan Schueftan is head of the International Graduate Programme in National Securities Studies at Haifa University, who has published extensively on Mid-East history and politics
