Following Israel’s strikes against the Islamic Republic, the already heightened risk of Iranian-sponsored terror on British soil has only increased. The Community Security Trust (CST) immediately advised British Jews to exercise vigilance in public places. Yet even in this critical moment, the Labour government refuses to proscribe the regime’s shock troops – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Such inaction constitutes a profound dereliction of duty.
As Iran finds itself increasingly powerless to stop Israel from systematically eliminating its nuclear programme and senior military leadership, it is left with one predictable response: terror. That has already played out in recent days through missile attacks on Israeli civilians. The other avenue is terror abroad, a strategy the regime has pursued for decades.
Just last month, even before the Israel-Iran war entered its current and potentially final chapter, UK special forces and counter-terrorism police arrested a group of Iranians suspected of reportedly planning an imminent attack on the Israeli embassy in London. What happens in the region does not remain there, it is exported globally, with Britain on the front line.
As recently as October 2024, Ken McCallum, Director General of MI5, warned that Iranian plots on UK soil could escalate if regional conflict intensified. He noted that Tehran could “repurpose” its criminal networks to target British citizens. Since the start of 2022, Britain has thwarted at least 20 Iran-backed plots. In December 2023, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) described “unprecedented threats from the Iranian regime,” including plots to kill individuals on British soil and efforts to destabilise the Middle East.
And yet, with respect to Iran, successive British governments have sought to draw a clean distinction between domestic and international security even though they are clearly intertwined. The UK’s response has so far been largely confined to applying sanctions against the IRGC under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act – a measure that is entirely inadequate. These sanctions may disrupt some operations abroad, but they do nothing to constrain the IRGC’s activities within the UK.
The results are alarming. Religious colleges in Britain with links to Tehran have employed individuals who glorify Hezbollah, deny the Holocaust, compare Israel to Nazi Germany, and honour the IRGC’s late commander, Qassem Soleimani. These institutions function as ideological beachheads for a hostile regime. They must be shut down, not tolerated.
To contain this threat, the IRGC must be proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 3 of the Act allows the government to ban any group that “commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism), or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.” This basically describes the IRGC’s core purpose.
Proscribing the IRGC is not a mere symbolic gesture; it is a national security imperative that would make a huge difference in protecting our country. The Terrorism Act 2000 offers a wide range of provisions to prevent the transfer of assets to proscribed terrorist groups or the support of terrorism more broadly, and establishes offenses related to terrorist property, fundraising and support.
Unless the UK government proscribes the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, the authorities will be unable to proscribe specific Iranian financial institutions that operate in the City of London that have been accused of supporting the IRGC’s nuclear programme and terrorist activities. In turn, this undermines the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which sanctions the IRGC for these activities abroad.
Furthermore, the lack of proscription allows the IRGC to more easily infiltrate mosques, access community centres, incite violence, radicalise youth, and recruit through drug traffickers and local gangs. Earlier this month, three Iranian nationals were charged with engaging in conduct likely to assist the Iranian foreign intelligence service. One of them was also charged with engaging in surveillance, reconnaissance and open-source research, with the intention of committing serious violence against a person in the UK.
The Iranian regime also uses the IRGC’s Al-Mustafa International University, which has branches around the world, to export Iran’s Islamic revolution by recruiting international students. This enables the IRGC to access foreign communities by infiltrating mosques, and community sectors in European countries. Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei has personally appointed IRGC-linked representatives to direct British religious and educational organisations with links to Al-Mustafa International University. In turn, a number of British educational and Islamic organisations and charities host IRGC speakers that have espoused antisemitism and incited to violence.
The evidence is overwhelming. The threat is escalating. The government must act – not next month, not after the next plot, but now. Proscribing the IRGC is a basic act of democratic self-defence. Every day of delay is another day of vulnerability. The Prime Minister has a duty to the British public: defend the realm, protect its people, and draw a clear line between this country and the enemies of liberty.
Barak M. Seener is a Senior Associate Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and author of the report “The Long Arm of Tehran: Why the UK Should Ban the IRGC.” He can be followed on X @BarakSeener.
